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The U.S. government recently launched a "cyberattack" on itself.
According to a report in the Washington Post, the Department of
Defense (DoD) "mounted a cyberattack that dismantled [an] online
forum" that was apparently "set up" by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).' The website was used by the CIA, along with its Saudi Arabian
counterpart, to monitor ongoing terrorist activity in the Saudi kingdom. 2
Military commanders viewed the website as a threat because it was
* Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy; Operations
Law Attorney, U.S. Cyber Command. The author would like to thank Eliana Davidson, Gary
Sharp, and the other members of the Intelligence division of the Department of Defense General
Counsel's office for their inspiration and mentorship. The views expressed in this Article are
those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department
of Defense or any of its components.
1. Ellen Nakashima, Dismantling of Saudi-CIA Web Site Illustrates Need for Clearer
Cyberwar Policies,WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2010, at Al.
2. Id
333
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being used by terrorists to exchange operational information and plan
attacks on soldiers in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. 3
Following lengthy briefings and discussions of legal authority, and over
a vigorous dissent from the CIA, a high-level task force apparently gave
approval for the military to conduct the cyber action against the
extremist website.4 According to the article, the action was carried out
by the Joint Functional Component Command-Network Warfare, based
at Fort Meade, Maryland.
The Post article raises a number of legal and policy issues
highlighted by this episode. This Article raises a broad point regarding
the legal authority for the military to carry out such activities. This
concern is alleged against the backdrop of an apparently ongoing
dispute between the CIA and the active duty military over whether such
an action is a "covert action" or a "traditional military activity."6 The
most tangible result of such a dispute is whether or not the cyber action
carried out by the military has to be reported to Congress in accordance
with the covert action oversight statute, the National Security Act of
1947, 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2009). The broader result, of course, is about
control; not only about who does such activities, but control over the
activities themselves. Previously, the same kind of inter-agency dispute
erupted over the use of Special Operations forces in activities that, if
carried out by the CIA, could be considered "covert action."7
These legal and policy disputes over the employment of Special
Operations forces and information-based actions, such as the attack on
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The article refers a number of times to the National Security Agency (NSA) and
its Director, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander. To the extent the article may give the
impression that Lieutenant General Alexander and NSA were in the line of command for the
alleged "cyberattack," such an impression would be mistaken. The JFCC-Network Warfare is
actually a component command of the U.S. Strategic Command, which is currently under the
command of General Kevin P. Chilton. See U.S. Strategic Command Factsheet,
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/snapshot/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
6. Nakashima, supra note 1, at Al ("[t]he use of computers to gather intelligence or to
disrupt the enemy presents complex questions: When is a cyberattack outside the theater of war
allowed? Is taking out an extremist website a covert operation or a traditional military activity?
Should Congress be informed?").
7. See, e.g., Richard C. Gross, Different Worlds: Unacknowledged Special Operations
and Covert Action (Mar. 30, 2009) (strategy research paper, U.S. Army War College, available
at http://www.fas.org/manleprint/gross.pdf) (discussing the "ongoing debate about the blurred
operational lines between the CIA on one hand and DoD special operations forces hunting
terrorists worldwide on the other."); see also Jennifer D. Kibbe, The Rise of the Shadow
Warriors, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 102, 105-15 (arguing that military special
operations often amount to the functional equivalent of "covert action" and should be held to the
same standard of accountability as CIA covert actions); Seymour M. Hersh, The Coming Wars:
What the Pentagon Can Now Do in Secret, NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 2005, at 40 (discussing thenSecretary of Defense Rumsfeld's use of Special Forces units in covert action).
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the jihadist website, will grow increasingly important in the coming
years. The United States faces an agile, networked adversary. The age
of "netwar" is upon us.8 Speed and flexibility will be essential to
meeting and defeating networked enemies, such as al Qaeda. John
Arquilla, the foremost thinker about networked warfare, recently called
for the military to develop new rules for confronting such enemies.9 In a
nutshell, Arquilla's rules are: "Many and small" forces finding rather
than flanking the adversary by swarming, not surging.' 0 Special
Operations forces are in the forefront of today's military in this style of
warfare. Special Operations units are normally broken down into
twelve-man "A teams" or squads, depending on the service." The teams
train as a unit and are often called on to carry out operations that would
require greater numbers of regular troops.12 Likewise, informationbased warfare assumes greater prominence and dominance in a world
dominated by networks. Warfare using the network of networks-the
Internet-will be the ultimate force multiplier against networked
adversaries, whether they are international terrorists, international drug
traffickers, or the armed forces of adversary states. In order to respond
with the speed and agility required in a networked environment, legal
rules and authorities must keep pace with technology and changing
methods of warfare.
The first step in achieving this speed and agility is recognizing that
there are a vast array of traditional military activities that can occur in
the Internet and other information environments that do not need to be
reported to Congress as "covert actions." Although one may argue with
it as a policy decision,1 this Article argues that the military's decision
8. The term "netwar" was coined by Rand researchers John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt
and refers to "conflicts waged on the one hand, by terrorists, criminals, [gangs,] and
ethnonationalist extremists; and by civil-society activists on the other . . . [that use a] networked
organizational structure. . . [and make it critical that] governments and their military and law
enforcement establishments . . . begin networking themselves." NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE
FuTURE OF TERROR, CRIME, AND MILITANCY ix, xii (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt eds., Rand

Corp. 2001).
9. John Arquilla, The New Rules of War, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar.-Apr. 2010, at 60, 63.
10. The rules Arquilla sets forth are: "Rule 1: 'Many and Small' Beats 'Few and Large,"'
"Rule 2: Finding Matters More Than Flanking," and "Rule 3: Swarming is the New Surging."
Id. at 63-65.
I1.

See ROBIN NEILLANDS, IN THE COMBAT ZONE: SPECIAL FORCES SINCE 1945, at 164

(N.Y.U. Press 1998).
12. See id. at 46 (quoting a World War II British Commando officer telling his men
"Given time, any infantry unit can do what we do; the point is that only Commandos can do it in
the time available.").
13. In essence, this appears to be a variant of the classic tension that occurs between law
enforcement and counter-intelligence. Here, though, the tension is not between continued
intelligence collection and prosecution, but between collection and elimination of operational
threats. As Martin Libicki explains, in the context of "cyberwar," "[i]ntelligence operatives are
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to conduct a cyber action against the CIA and Saudi-monitored website
was well within the norms of traditional military activity. Because the
action occurred during the course of an armed conflict against al Qaeda,
there would also be no need to acknowledge such an action when it was
directed by a military commander. This Article explores the array of
traditional military activities that may occur in the Internet and other
information environments without triggering covert action reporting
requirements through the prism of a historical examination of two types
of military activity that contribute to the accomplishment of strategic
surprise: positioning of forces and deception operations.
Part I of this Article examines the language and legislative history of
the definition of "covert action." The legislative history is particularly
important to understanding this definition, which is unfortunate iven
the often cursory treatment it has received in academic literature.' The
legislative history draws some clear boundaries that need to be explored
in order to provide the proper context for the subsequent discussion.
Part II examines the historical use of two types of military activity,
force positioning and deception operation, in accomplishing strategic
surprise. This examination occurs in parallel with an examination of
analogous hypothetical and not-so-hypothetical information-based
actions occurring within and against the Internet and other informationbased networks and equipment. The latter sections also examine and
discuss why these information-based actions fit within the rubric of
"traditional military activities." Finally, Part III concludes with an
assessment of the applicability of traditional military activities in
"cyberspace" and discusses the oversight mechanisms applicable to
"traditional military activity." This section concludes that the same
policy concerns requiring aggressive oversight of covert action are
mitigated by the multi-layered review process inherent in the war
planning process.

oriented toward finding information about the adversary. Military operators are oriented toward
reducing the adversary's ability to wage war, which in this context, generally means reducing
the its [sic] ability to take advantage of information and communications." MARTIN C. LIBICKI,
CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR 155-56 (Rand Corp. 2009).
14. See Joel T. Meyer, Recent Developments: Supervising the Pentagon: Covert Action
and TraditionalMilitary Activities in the War on Terror, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 463, 469-70 nn.4045 (2007) (citing the conference and Senate report from the pocket-vetoed 1990 Intelligence
Authorization Act rather than the reports that accompanied the Act that passed the following
year); Michael McAndrew, Note, Wrangling in the Shadows: The Use of United States Special
Forces in Covert Military Operations in the War on Terror,29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 153,
154-55 (2006) (spending less than a paragraph on the legislative history).
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I. THE COVERT ACTION REPORTING STATUTE
A. Defining "Covert Action"
Congress first defined "covert action" in 1991." The Intelligence
Authorization Act for that year added a section titled "Presidential
Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions" to the National Security
Act of 1947.16 In what was largely a codification of then-existing
Executive practice,' 7 the section required the President to issue, in
writing, a "finding" authorizing any proposed covert action.18 Congress
also made it clear that, in making such a finding, the President had to
determine that the covert action he was approving was "necessary to
support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and
was important to the national security of the United States . .
(emphasis added).1 9 The new section also imposed a number of
additional process requirements, such as detailing the specific
requirements for written findings; 20 congressional notification
procedures, including notification of sinificant changes or additions
based on previously approved findings; and an actual definition of
"covert action." 22 Subsection (e) defined "covert action" as "activities
of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
"23 This is the affirmative portion of the definition. This
publicly .
portion can be further broken down into purpose and methodology.
First, as to purpose, covert actions are used to influence conditions
abroad, or outside the United States.2 4 According to the definition, that
influence can be felt in three fairly broad areas: political, economic, and
15. The current definition of "covert action" is unchanged from its first enactment. See
Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2009).
16. See 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2009).
17. See generally William E. Conner, Reforming Oversight of Covert Actions After the
Iran-ContraAffair: A Legislative History of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1991, 32
VA. J. INT'L L. 900, 902-18 (1992) (discussing the provisions of various National Security
Decision Directives (NSDDs) issued by President Reagan in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair
that instituted additional process requirements for covert actions). Conner later concludes that
"the Act's notification requirements do not radically depart from existing covert action reporting
procedures which were promulgated previously by various Executive Orders and NSDDs." Id.
at 922.
18. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(1).
19. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a).
20. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(3)-(5).

21.

50 U.S.C. § 413b(b)-(d).

22.
23.
24.

50 U.S.C.
Id.
Id.

§ 413b(e).
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military. 25 Interestingly, neither the statute, nor the legislative history
provide specific guidance as to what constitutes "military conditions."
The legislative history does make it clear that the definition was meant
to encompass then-existing practices.27 The fairest reading, then, is that
"military conditions" is meant to encompass the types of paramilitary
operations carried out by the CIA, usually by arming and equipping
indigenous or guerilla forces or by conducting "over the border"
operations that cannot be carried out by U.S. military forces for political
reasons.28 What must be understood, though, is that simply influencing
conditions abroad is not sufficient to justify carrying out a covert action.
Implicit in the requirements for a presidential finding is the added
purpose that the condition to be influenced by the covert action support
an "identifiable foreign policy objective[] of the United States." So,
the purpose of a covert action is to support "identifiable foreign policy
objectives of the United States" by "influenc[ing] political, economic,
or military conditions abroad." 30 This linkage between covert action and
broader U.S. foreign policy objectives is a distinction that assumes
greater importance when the purpose of "traditional military activities"
is later examined.
Whereas the first portion of the definition concerns what will be
accomplished through covert action, the second portion concerns how

25. Id.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 102-166 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 243.
The Conference Report, in the context of counterintelligence, mentions that such activities could
cross a line into covert action if they are "undertaken to effect major changes in the national
defense policies of such foreign powers or to provoke significant military responses by such
foreign powers." H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 24 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 243, 252. Interestingly, despite the seemingly obvious connection, this language
is not tied to the statute's use of "military conditions," nor is it repeated in the portion of the
report that discusses "traditional military activities."
27. The Conference Report stated:
The conferees further note that in defining for the first time in statute the term
"covert action" they do not intend that the new definition exclude any activity
which heretofore has been understood to be a covert action, nor to include any
activity not heretofore understood to be a covert action[.] The new definition is
meant to clarify the understanding of intelligence activities that require
presidential approval and reporting to Congress; not to relax or go beyond
previous understandings.
H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 23 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 243, 251.
28.

See JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CoMMUNITY 349 (4th ed.

Westview Press 1999) (detailing covert operations
administrations).
29. H.R.REP.No. 102-166,at2l.
30. See id., as well as 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e).
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the action will be accomplished. Covert actions are carried out in a
manner such that either "the role of the United States Government will
not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."3 ' The use of the disjunctive
"or" means that a covert action could occur where the role of the United
States is not to be acknowledged, even if U.S. involvement is readily
"apparent" in the results of effects of the covert action. The use of such
"overt-covert operation[s]" 32 increased during the Reagan and first Bush
administrations and continues today.33 As a current example, it is
widely reported that the CIA is operating the Predator drones carrying
out airstrikes against al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. 34 Apparently, the
mission was initially entrusted to the CIA given the political
sensitivities such strikes would cause for the Pakistani government.35
Yet, despite widespread publicity, the United States has steadfastly
refused to officially confirm the role of the CIA in these strikes,
despite the suicide strike directed at CIA officers in Afghanistan
allegedly involved in such strikes. 37 If true, this is the type of classic
"over the border" covert action historically 3 iven to the CIA, for
example in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, there is
often too much emphasis on this aspect of the definition, particularly in
popular media accounts, without accounting for the fact that this portion
works conjunctively with the purpose portion of the definition. As a
result, popular accounts sweep too broadly, often characterizing actions
as "covert" that are clearly not, merely because the activity is hidden
from public view.
Another prominent feature of the definition is that it is neutral in
application. In other words, it does not apply to any specific executive
branch agency, for instance the CIA, but instead applies to the U.S.
government as a whole.39 A former National Security Council legal
adviser, Judge James E. Baker, described the definition as "act-based,
31. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e); H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 14.
32. RICHELSON, supra note 28, at 349. Richelson points to the efforts to overthrow the
Sandinista government and support for the Afghan resistance to the Soviets as the "clearest"
examples of "overt-covert example." Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Scott Shane, CIA to Expand Use ofDrones in Pakistan,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2009, at Al (calling the CIA-run program "[olne of Washington's worst-kept secrets"),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/world/asia/04drones.html?scp=1&sq=cia%20
expanding%20drone%20assaults%20in%20pakistan&st=cse.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Joby Warrick & Pamela Constable, CIA Base Attacked in Afghanistan Supported
Airstrikes Against al-Qaeda, Taliban, WASH. PosT, Jan. 1, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/31/AR2009123100541.html.
38. See generally The CIA's Vietnam Histories, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB284/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
39. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e).
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not actor-based." 40 Judge Baker also recognizes, however, that such a
characterization may be undercut by the negative portion of the
definition, in other words, that portion describing the exceptions to the
general definition of covert action.4 1 Although the exceptions
themselves are stated in terms of activities, in each case the activity is
primarily identified with a major executive branch agency. For instance,
"traditional counterintelligence activities'4 2 and "traditional law
enforcement activities" 43 encompass the entirety of Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) operations. To the extent the FBI recently began
collecting foreign intelligence, there is an exception for "activities the
primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence,'A4 which is also the
exception that covers the collection activities of the rest of the
intelligence community.4 5 Likewise, the State Department and
Department of Defense (DoD) are the agencies primarily covered by the
exception for "traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine
Thus, while in theory the definition of
support to such activities.'
covert action applies to more agencies than just the CIA, in actual,
practical application, the two agencies, FBI and DoD, that conduct
activities most similar in appearance (though not purpose) to covert
actions are essentially excepted from the scope of the definition. This
becomes even more apparent in the case of the Defense Department
when the legislative history is fully considered.4 7
B. Legislative History and the "TraditionalMilitary Activity" Exception
The legislative history draws two distinct lines to help address
whether an action or activity is a traditional military activity or a covert
action. The first, and clearest, line is whether the activity is under the
"direction and control of a United States military commander.' " The
40.

JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURIY

LAW FOR PERILOUS

TIMES 151 (Cambridge U. Press 2007).
41. Id. at 151, 157 (stating that "uniformed military operations have historically not been
considered or treated as covert activities. Thus, even if the definition is act based, the exception
for 'traditionalmilitary activities' may effectively remove clandestine military operationsfrom
its reach.") (emphasis added).
42. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e)(1),(3).
43. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e)(3).
44. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e)(1).
45. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59, 941 (Dec. 4, 1981) (using the
term "clandestine" to refer to certain intelligence collection activities of certain intelligence
agencies, including the intelligence and counter-intelligence activities of the armed forces).
46. H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 24 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
243, 252; 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e)(2). Rather than use the direct quotation format of "traditional ...
military activities," this Article will use "traditional military activities" to refer to this exception.
47. See generally H.R. REP. No. 102-166.
48. Id. The same language is also contained in the Senate Report on the Intelligence
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second line appears to be temporally-based in that there may be a point
"well in advance of a possible or eventual U.S. military operation'A9
where a military-led activity could constitute a covert action, as long as
the activity would not be considered "routine support" to the eventual
military operation. 0 Each of these lines deserves to be considered in
greater detail.
The first bright line the House and Senate conferees drew was that
"traditional military activities" are always controlled by a military
commander. 5 1 Simply put, no military commander means it is not a
traditional military activity. Most significantly, the U.S. government
sponsorship of any specific "traditional military activity" does not have
to be apparent, or even later acknowledged, when the activity precedes
and is related to anticipated or ongoing hostilities and where the "fact of
the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged
publicly." 52 In other words, even if an activity undertaken by the
military looks like a "covert action" because, in part, U.S. sponsorship
is not apparent or will not be acknowledged, as long as the activity is
under the direction and control of a U.S. military commander and the
U.S. involvement in the overall conflict is apparent or has been
acknowledged, the activity is a traditional military activity, not a covert
action. Simply put: military commanders do not have to acknowledge or
make apparent activities that they conduct during acknowledged
hostilities, whether ongoing or anticipated.
As an illustration, recall the military action against the extremist
website discussed in the introduction to this Article. The State
Department Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, recently reaffirmed that the
United States is in either a war of self-defense or armed conflict with al
Qaeda5 3 (hostilities, in other words). During hostilities, a military
commander apparently ordered an action taken against a website that
served as a recruiting and information site for al Qaeda and other
extremists. 5 4 As the Washington Post article points out, the action was
requested by a senior military commander in Iraq, who made a

Authorization Act for 1991. See S. REP. No. 102-85, at 43 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 193, 239.
49. H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 24 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
243, 252.
50. Id.
51. Id. ("Activities that are not under the direction and control of a military commander
should not be considered as 'traditional military activities.').
52. Id. at 30.
53. Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Keynote Speech at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and
International Law (Mar. 24, 2010).
54. Nakashima, supra note 1, at Al.
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compelling case that the website led to the deaths of American
soldiers.55 Thus, in openly acknowledged, ongoing hostilities with al
Qaeda, the military commander's direction to take action against the
extremist website is a "traditional military activity," and U.S.
involvement in the action against the site does not have to be apparent
or ever even acknowledged.
In fact, the legislative history is so clear on this point that it seriously
undermines Judge Baker's contention that the covert action definition is
act-based rather than actor-based. 56 The actor at issue, though, is not a
federal agency, but an individual: a military commander. In cases of
ongoing hostilities, the legislative history does not place any limit on
the type of acts or activity that can be brought within the rubric of
"traditional military activity."57 All that matters in such instances is that
the activity is "under the direction and control of a United States
military commander.. ."58

Hostilities do not even have to be "ongoing" or even imminent, just
"anticipated." 59 The Conference Report defines hostilities that are
"anticipated" as "meaning approval has been given by the National
Command Authorities for the activities and for operational planning for
hostilities." 60 Although the definition contemplates two separate
approvals, one for the specific activity and another for the operational
planning the activity supports, there is potentially broad application.
Militaries routinely conduct "operational planning for hostilities."
Colloquially, they are known as "war plans." Such operational planning
often occurs years, even decades, before any actual hostilities.
For instance, before World War I, the German General Staff
continually updated plans for future operations against France.6 1 The
"Schlieffen Plan" was first developed beginning in 189562 and was
extensively war-gamed in 1904-05.6 Schlieffen's plan envisioned a
massive flanking maneuver through Belgium, with only a small

55. Id.
56. Cf BAKER, supra note 40, at 151; H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 24 (1991) (Conf. Rep.),
reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 243, 252.
57. H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 24 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
243, 252.
58. Id. at 24, 30.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Klaus Knorr, Strategic Surprise in Four European Wars, in STRATEGIC MILITARY
SURPRISE: INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES 9, 16 (Klaus Knorr & Patrick Morgan eds.,
Transaction Publishers 1984) [hereinafter STRATEGIC MLITARY SURPRISE].

62. Id.
63. See STEFAN T. PossoNY, SURPRISE 1, 3 (Stefan T. Possony & Daniel Vilfroy trans.,
Military Service Publishing Co. 1957).
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The plan was
defensive force on the border opposite France.
continually updated and modified by his successors, in part because of
French familiarity with the major outlines of the plan.65 The plan
actually employed by the Germans in 1914 shifted a significant number
of divisions away from the flanking maneuver, placing them in
defensive positions to the south. 66 Likewise, during the Cold War, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and Warsaw Pact
countries both drew up extensive plans for land war in Europe, with
NATO long anticipating a Soviet attack along the NATO central front.6 7
As part of the preparations for war with the Soviets, U.S. Special Forces
were "charged with exploring the mountains of southern Germany and
Austria, finding sites for guerilla bases, establishing dumps of weapons
and explosives, and assisting the newly established German and
Austrian Armies in clandestine and behind-the-lines operations." 68
The actor-based distinction applies even when activities occur in
anticipation of hostilities. 69 When under the direction and control of a
military commander, such activities do not have to be apparent or
acknowledged, as long as U.S. involvement in the future hostilities will
be later apparent or acknowledged. 70 Even after U.S. involvement in
hostilities is apparent or acknowledged, there would still be no
requirement to acknowledge any of the "traditional military activities"
that occurred in anticipation of the hostilities.
The Conference Report does attempt to place an ill-defined limit on
"traditional military activities" in anticipation of hostilities. 72 The
Conferees stated: "Whether or not activities undertaken well in advance
of a possible or eventual U.S. military operation constitute 'covert
action' will depend in most cases upon whether they constitute 'routine
support' to such an operation, as explained in the report accompanying

64.

Knorr, Strategic Surprise in FourEuropean Wars, in STRATEGIC MILITARY SURPRISE,

supra note 61, at 16.
65. Id. at 17.
66. Id. at 16.
67.

See generally RICHARD K. BETTS, SURPRISE ATrACK: LESSONS FOR DEFENSE

PLANNING 154 n.1 (Brookings Institution Press 1982) (defining the central front as "run[ning]
from the Baltic, along the intra-German and Czechoslovakian borders, to the Austrian
frontier."). Chapter Six of Betts's book analyzes the possibilities of strategic surprise by the
Soviets in this area, and the factors that made NATO potentially vulnerable to such an attack. Id.
at 153-88.
68. NEILLANDS, supra note 11, at 76 (describing the mission of the first post-war Special
Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group).
69. H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 24, 30 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 243, 252.
70. Id.
7 1. Id.
72. Id at 30.
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the Senate bill."7 The Conferees gave no indication of the temporal
scope of "well in advance," so there is ambiguity as to where in time the
line is between "routine support" and "traditional military activity." Put
another way, where is the line between act-based determinations that an
activity is a covert action and the actor-based "traditional military
activity"? The Senate Report attempted to provide some guidance as to
what was considered routine support, but provided no better idea as to
when in the planning process "routine support" gives way to "traditional
military activity."
In the Senate report, the unilateral nature of an activity is the
lynchpin between "routine support" "well in advance" of a U.S. military
operation and "other-than-routine" support. 74 In the case of "routine
support," the unilateral U.S. activity must relate to "logistical or other
support for U.S. military forces in the event of a military operation that
is to be publicly acknowledged."7 5 Examples provided include "caching
communications equipment or weapons, the lease or purchase from
unwitting sources of residential or commercial property to support an
aspect of an operation, or obtaining currency or documentation for
possible operational uses, if the operation as a whole is to be publicly
acknowledged."' 76 Not all of the examples involve the U.S. military
acting alone. But in those examples the "unwitting" third-party is
carrying out a commercial transaction as he would with any other
customer; he has not become an active part of the activity.
By way of contrast, the foreign nationals that appear in the Senate
examples of "other-than-routine" support know they are dealing with
the U.S. military and are actively participating in the activity:
[C]landestine attempts to recruit or train foreign nationals with
access to the target country to support U.S. forces in the event of
a military operation; clandestine effects to influence foreign
nationals of the target country concerned to take certain actions in
the event of a U.S. military operation; clandestine efforts to
influence and effect public opinion in the country concerned
where U.S. sponsorship of such efforts is concealed; and
clandestine efforts to influence foreign officials in third countries
to take certain actions without the knowledge or approval of their
government in the event of a U.S. military operation.7 7

73. Id.
74. S. REP. No. 102-85, at 47 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 193, 240.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss3/1

12

Walker: Traditional Military Activities in Cyberspace: Preparing for "Net

TRADITIONAL MILITARYACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: PREPARING FOR "NETWAR"

20101

345

The last three examples use the word "influence," specifically tying
those examples to the affirmative portion of the covert action definition.
While the first example does not use "influence," it appears to be
directed at the "military conditions" inside a target country, rather than
the gathering of intelligence. The Senate report considers these
examples, where there is the active involvement of a foreign national in
the U.S. military activity to be "other than unilateral" and thus "otherthan-routine" support activities.
Taken as a whole, then, during the "well in advance" of hostilities
timeframe, the key distinction for routine and non-routine support is for
the U.S. military to act without actively involving foreign nationals to
exert influence. There remain a great many logistical and support
activities that can be accomplished under the rubric of "routine support"
in target countries "well in advance" of hostilities. Of course, when the
situation is not well in advance of hostilities, but there is operational
planning for anticipated hostilities, then even the examples of "otherthan-routine" support could occur as "traditional military activities," as
long as they are carried out under the direction and control of a military
commander.
The next part of the Article is a non-comprehensive historical survey
of certain types of military activities compared in parallel with
hypothetical military activities in cyberspace. It is not an attempt to
define comprehensively what is meant by "routine support" or even
"traditional military activity." Instead, each historical section is
intended to provide factual, historical context for the subsequent section
that follows discussing hypothetical military activities in cyberspace.
The activities covered in the next section are suggestive of the outcomes
that military use of information-based actions could achieve in
anticipation of, or during, hostilities. The analogous information-based
activities, when undertaken under the direction and control of a military
commander, would be traditional military activities and not covert
action.

II. ACHIEVING SURPRISE
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of significant studies
were published in the military strategy field on the subject of surprise
attacks. 79 Strategic thought in the 1960s tended to discount the utility of
surprise in warfare due to the explosion in the number and type of
technical means of intelligence collection. Extensive collection
78. Compare with the exception for collection of intelligence, under 50 U.S.C.
413b(e)(1).
79.

§

See, e.g., STRATEGIC MILITARY SURPRISE, supra note 61; BETTS, supra note 67.
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capabilities, it was thought, would provide the amount of indications
and warnings of surprise attack that were missed at Pearl Harbor and on
multiple occasions during the Second World War. The impetus behind
this wave of scholarship on the utility of "strategic surprise"so in
warfare was the success of both sides in the Arab-Israeli Wars in
achieving surprise at various times. 8 Significantly, in both the Six
Days' War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973), surprise was
achieved at the initiation of hostilities. The two most detailed studies,
Richard K. Betts's Surprise Attack and Strategic Military Surprise,
edited by Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, both reach the same
conclusion: regardless of improvements in technology, intelligence, and
decision-making processes, strategic surprise in war will continue to
successfully occur. 83 Twenty years later, the al Qaeda attacks on
September 11, 2001, demonstrated the truth and staying power of that
conclusion.
There are distinct parallels between these studies of strategic surprise
and modern-day information operations. First, the language is often
similar. For instance, "strategic surprise" theorists often speak of
increasing the "noise" in order to increase ambiguity or deceive

80. Knorr and Morgan define "strategic surprise" based on purpose and context, where
the purpose is "to inflict a striking defeat that sharply alters the military situation and possibly
determines the outcome of the conflict." Klaus Knorr & Patrick Morgan, Strategic Surprise:An
Introduction, in STRATEGIC MILITARY SURPRISE, supra note 61, at 1. In contrast, Betts, a
contributor to the Knorr-Morgan volume, in his later book provides a much broader definition,
stating that "[s]trategic surprise occurs to the degree that the victim does not appreciate whether,
when, where, or how the adversary will strike." BETrS, supra note 67, at 4.
81. The outcome of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 also led to a number of Israel-authored
studies focused on that conflict, such as MICHAEL I. HANDEL, PERCEPTION, DECEPTION AND
SURPRISE: THE CASE OF THE YoM KIPPUR WAR (Hebrew U. of Jerusalem 1976), and a later, more
comprehensive treatment. See URI BAR-JOSEPH, THE WATCHMAN FELL ASLEEP: THE SURPRISE OF
Youm KIPPUR AND ITS SOURCES (State U. of New York Press 2005).

82. Unlike Knorr, Morgan, and Betts, Ephraim Kam takes the narrow view of "the
outbreak of war by surprise attack as a specific-indeed the most complex-instance of
strategic surprise." EPHRAIM KAM, SURPRISE ATrACK: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE 2 (Harvard U.

Press 2004).
83. BETTS, supra note 67, at 8 ("there is reason to doubt that precedent can steer defense
planning away from the pitfall of surprise"); Klaus Knorr, Lessons ForStatecraft, in STRATEGIC
MILITARY SURPRISE, supra note 61, at 264 ("It is our overall conclusion that the business of

minimizing strategic surprise faces odds that . .. are very formidable indeed."); HANDEL, supra
note 81, at 7 ("[The five paradoxes described] tend to strengthen my pessimistic conclusion that
there is little chance . .. to prevent or forestall an impending surprise attack. Very few surprise
attacks on the strategic level have ever failed."); KAM, supra note 82, at xxv (stating that the
first edition of the book "presents a rather pessimistic conclusion, namely, that it is at best very
difficult to prevent surprise attacks" and stating that "the lessons of the last fifteen years support
this conclusion").
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decision-makers. 84 Information operations theorists also speak of
"noise" either generated by information operations or information
operations used defensively to reduce "noise."85 "Perception" comes
into play in both efforts at strategic surprise and information
operations.86 Another parallel, so close as to constitute an intersection,
in fact, is the use of deception. As will be shown, deception operations
are critical to achieving strategic surprise. At least in U.S. doctrine,
deception and psychological operations are important components of
information operations.
These similarities and parallels point to strategic surprise as a
valuable lens through which to understand how some of the more
intrusive, and potentially controversial, information-based actions
possibly available to the United States should be viewed as "traditional
military activities." The following sections of this Article examine two
of the many factors that are identified with successful strategic surprise:
(1) getting forces into attack position, sometimes, but not always,
secretly; and (2) deception operations. This Article will proceed in
parallel, with each section on a strategic surprise factor immediately
followed by a section examining possible uses of information-based
actions to accomplish the same or similar outcomes. In this way, it will
be seen that this modem modality of warfare-involving networks,
computers, and information systems-can be used for purposes with
roots buried deep in military strategy and traditions.
A. PositioningofForces: HistoricalOverview
There are many ways forces get in position for surprise attacks.
Fortune is often involved; secrecy rarely. All too often, the attacking
forces are seen or observed, but the importance of the observation is
either discounted or misinterpreted. An example of the latter occurred at
the Battle of Quebec (September 13, 1759) during the French and
Indian Wars. The French forces in Quebec thought that the St.
84. See, e.g., John Lewis Gaddis, On Strategic Surprise, HOOVER DIGEST, Apr. 30, 2002,
availableat http://www.hoover.org/publications/hover-digest/article/7582.
85. See generally John R. Pierce, AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION THEORY: SYMBOLS,
SIGNALS AND NOISE (2d ed. 1980).

86. See, e.g., Patrick Morgan, The Opportunityfor a Strategic Surprise, in STRATEGIC
MILITARY SURPRISE, supra note 61, at 208-25 (discussing the stages of threat perception in

government decision-making leading to opportunities for strategic surprise); Leigh Armistead,
INFORMATION OPERATIONS: WARFARE AND THE HARD REALITY OF SoFT POWER 1 (2004)
("[Information] is about perception, because information is an enabler, a 'source multiplier,' a
tool that increases one's ability to shape the operational environment.").
87. Robin Brown, Spinning the War: PoliticalCommunication, Information Operations
and Public Diplomacy in the War on Terrorism, in WAR AND THE MEDIA: REPORTING CONFLICT

24/7, at 90 (Daya Kishan Thussu & Des Freedman eds., 2003).
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Lawrence River was not passable for British shipping upstream of the
city. The British discovered that it was. On their way up past the city,
the British ships were spotted by French sentries who thought the ships
were a scheduled supply convoy from Montreal, downriver from
Quebec. Fortuitously for the British, the sentries were not told of the
convoy's cancellation, so they did not raise the alarm. The British
managed to get uriver, land their forces on the Plains of Abraham and
defeat the French.
Luck, of course, plays a role in any military operation, but planning
and preparation go a long way toward making one's own luck. In 1941,
Japanese carrier forces approached Hawaii from the Northwest. The
direction was unexpected not only because it was outside the usual
shipping lanes, but also because it was generally thought that weather in
that region of the Pacific, at that time of year, would prevent such an
approach. 89 The Japanese managed to scout the route, though, using a
three-man team of Naval officers on a Japanese commercial vessel that
traveled the northern route from Japan to Hawaii. 90 The officers did not
see another vessel on the entire trip and they were able to determine the
outer boundary of U.S. aerial surveillance from Hawaii, critical facts to
the success of the surprise attack against the U.S. Fleet in Pearl
Harbor.91 The Japanese Fleet was never observed by another vessel
during its approach to the launch point. That secrecy was maintained
through strict radio silence during the course of the voyage from
Japan.92
In a similar fashion, strict radio silence was observed in the approach
of nearly the entire Israeli Air Force against Egyptian airfields at the
start of the Six Days' War in 1967. The silence was so strenuous that
"[e]ven a pilot who had to bail out on the way to the target could not
report his position." 93 Unlike the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, the Israelis
specifically chose not to attack at dawn. Instead, they waited until 8:45
AM, after Egypt's early morning patrols had returned to base and the
Egyptians, who expected any attack would come at dawn, assumed the

88. The facts in this paragraph are drawn from PAUL K. DAVIs, 100 DECISIVE BATTLES
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT: THE WORLD'S MAJOR BATTLES AND How THEY SHAPED

HISTORY (Oxford U. Press 1999).
89.

See GORDON W. PRANGE, AT DAWN WE SLEPT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PEARL

HARBOR 227, 232 (Penguin Books 1991). In addition, the main Japanese thrust was believed to
be planned against the Philippines. Cf id. at 224.
90. Id. at 315-16.
91. Id. at 316.
92. Id. at 741-42.
93. Michael Handel, Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars, in STRATEGIC
MILITARY SURPRISE, supra note 61, at 134.
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day would be a routine one. 94 Apparently, the time was not pushed later
because the Israelis knew that senior Egyptian Air Force leaders would
be on their way to, but not yet at, work at the time of the strike. 95
In many cases, the forces are built up gradually, as the Germans did
in the Ardennes before the Blitzkrieg into France in 1940. Allied forces
were surprised not only by the location of the breakthrough, but also the
speed and strength of the assault. 96 The gradual German buildup was
aided by the fact that the French and British were focused on German
forces accumulating on the Low Country borders, in a manner
reminiscent of the start of the First World War.97 Although Knorr terms
this a "deception," 98 it was actually more of a distraction, as the German
force actually did invade and march through the Low Countries of
Belgium and Luxembourg en route to France.
Many surprise attacks occur with the attacking forces in plain sight.
This happened in the Second World War when Germany invaded
Russia, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the ground aspect of the Six
Days' War, and Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The presence
of these forces was often explained through intentional deception
operations or misperceptions by the defending party, and sometimes
both. These aspects will be explored in succeeding sections.
B. Positioningin Cyberspace: Access andAction
There are two aspects to "force positioning" in information-based
actions against networks, computers, or other information systems. The
first aspect is about gaining access to the targeted network, computer, or
system. To conduct information-based actions, it is usually necessary to
exploit a vulnerability in the system in order to get inside the system.
Once inside, one of the activities that can then be carried out is an
information-based action that enables the "force positioning" of
conventional forces. This latter point is the second aspect of "force
positioning" related to information-based actions.
A recent National Research Council study describes two types of
access for conducting information-based actions: remote access and

94. Id. Coming from the direction of Israel, attack aircraft would have the rising sun
behind them and make it much more difficult for defenders to see and target the attacking
aircraft. Id. at 133.
95. Id.
96. See Knorr, Strategic Surprise in Four European Wars, in STRATEGIC MILITARY
SURPRISE, supra note 61, at 26.

97. See id.
98. See id.
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close access. 99 Remote-access uses techniques to access a network,
computer or information system from a distance, often, but not always,
using the Internet as the delivery vehicle.' 00 Examples include the use of
malicious software, such as viruses or worms; router compromises; use
of botnets; protocol compromises; and security penetrations.o10 Closeaccess techniques are used to access computers or systems that are not
able to be accessed remotely, generally because they are either not
connected to other networks ("air gapped") or because they are standalone systems, such as weapons systems. 02 Access to such systems
often requires either physical proximity to the targeted computer or
system or access to some level of the supply chain for the targeted
equipment or system.' 0 3
Whether access is achieved in a remote or close fashion, the
objective of access, at least in the context of warfare, is to provide the
ability to carry out a future action. As Martin Libicki points out, "it is
easier to set up [such] . . . conditions in peacetime . .. before the target's

security posture is tightened."104 Access then allows for either the
concurrent or later introduction of a payload designed to carry out
specific actions against the network or information system. Possible
actions include altering data, destroying data, sending false messages, or
causing systems to malfunction or stop working. So, in this context,
"force positioning" in information operations will often involve
peacetime access, either through remote or close means, in preparation
for later actions during hostilities.
Most readers will be familiar with many of the examples of remote
access delivery of payloads from media coverage of destructive worms
and viruses set loose indiscriminately by hackers. Less familiar may be
examples of close access to systems for the purpose of carrying out
information-based actions. What I have elsewhere referred to as "chiplevel actions',to is a prime example. Due to the multiplicity of methods
for compromising micro-chips and the difficulty of detecting those
problems, the microchip supply chain presents significant opportunities
to introduce vulnerabilities into systems. As an example, in 1982 the
CIA managed to place "[c]ontrived computer chips . . . into Soviet
99. TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF
CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 87 (William A. Owens et al. eds., National Academies Press 2009)
[hereinafter TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW].

100.
101.
detail).
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See generally id. at 92-101 (discussing each of these approaches to remote-access in
See generally id. at 101 -04 (discussing close-access approaches in detail).
See id. at 87.
LIBICKI, supra note 13, at 148.
See Paul A. Walker, Rethinking Computer Network "Attack": Implicationsfor Law

and U.S. Doctrine,4 J. NAT'L SECURTY L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2010).
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military equipment,"l06 as part of a covert operation that involved a
Canadian company in the Soviet supply chain.' 0 7 It has also been
reported that the French place compromised chips into the export
versions of their military equipment so that they can be disabled
remotely if they fall into hostile hands.
This type of payload is known as a "kill switch," although the
functionality implicit in that term is not limited to simply disabling a
system.109 To the extent the term embodies the idea of disabling the
functionality of a particular system, Libicki terms that type of action
"disruption," defined as "render[ing] military systems temporarily
incapable to a greater or lesser degree, leaving a different window of
opportunity to be exploited vigorously."" 0 Among the "legion"
examples that he provides are "command-and-control systems that
suddenly refuse to function, sensors that go black, weapons whose
electronics hang up (which prevents modem weapons from functioning,
even in a debased or manual mode)."' 1 ' Payloads that cause disruption
are essential to the second aspect of "force positioning" in informationbased actions. Disruptions to particular systems can be used to enable
the positioning of conventional forces to carry out attacks, either
undetected or with little opposition or warning.
Both Libicki and the National Research Council study point to air
defense systems, often called integrated air defense systems (IADS), as
an example." 2 The NRC study calls this a "force-multiplier effect"
because such an action "could disrupt the network's operation in
concert with a hostile flight oeration, potentially blinding the defense
system for a period of time." 3 There are claims that this is precisely
what happened when the Israeli Air Force bombed a suspected Syrian
nuclear facility in September, 2007.114 According to reports in the
technical press, "higher-level, nontactical penetrations . .. of the Syrian

command-and-control capability" led to the failure of the Syrian system

106. See Gus W. Weiss, The Farewell Dossier: Duping the Soviets, 39 STUD. IN
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of
INTELLIGENCE (1996),
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/farewell.htm.
107.

See THOMAS C. REED, AT THE ABYSS: AN INSIDER'S HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 268-

69 (2004).
108. See Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, IEEE SPECTRUM, May 2008, at 1,
availableat http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-for-the-kill-switch/0.
109. Id. at 2.
110. LIBICK, supra note 13, at 146.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 156; TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, supra note 99, at 91.
113. TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, supra note 99, at 91.
114. David A. Fulghum et al., Cyber-Combat'sFirstShot, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,

Nov. 26, 2007, at 28, 28.
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to respond to the incoming Israeli jets. 5 Speculation centered on the
possibility that "the commercial off-the-shelf microprocessors in the
Syrian radar might have been purposely fabricated with a hidden
'backdoor' inside. By sending a preprogrammed code to those chips, an
unknown antagonist had disrupted the chips' function and temporarily
blocked the radar."ll 6
In these kinds of systems, the compromised chip (or software, for
that matter) does not have to actually "kill" the system. Instead, the
system can be disrupted or degraded in a number of different ways to
permit the kinetic attack to proceed undetected or unmolested: "by not
seeing the target, seeing too many targets, failing to give or receive
cuing information, not getting missiles to fire, firing missiles in
directions that do not let them hit the target, or inappropriately emitting
detectable energy."117 Libicki goes on to point out it is the military, not
intelligence operatives, that are best situated to understand which of
these many options would be most effective." 8 According to Libicki,
not only do military operators have the best understanding of how such
systems work, but they will better comprehend the actions that the
adversary military will take when such systems fail.119
"Force positioning," then, in information-based operations means
not only the access necessary to carry out "cyberattacks," such as the
action to take down the insurgent website that has been referred to
throughout this Article. Positioning "force" in these kinds of operations
also means preparations to carry out information-based actions that
support kinetic attacks. Often, neither the action to gain access nor the
disruptive action will themselves be actual "attacks," as defined in
international humanitarian law. Instead, as can be seen by the parallel
with the analysis of surprise, such actions are precisely the types of
support to military operations that the military has traditionally
conducted. Regardless of how close they occur to anticipated hostilities,
the types of actions' 20 described in this section should be treated as
115. Id. (citing U.S. intelligence analysts for the assessment that this occurred as the result
of "network attack" and providing a timeline of the assault on the suspected reactor).
116. Adee, supra note 108, at 1.
117.

LIBICKI, supra note 13, at 156.

118. Id.
119. Id. ("[t]hose most likely to understand such failure modes-and thus those best
placed to plan a military campaign that uses operational cyberwar-are likely to be those who
understand how their own systems might fail.").
120. This specifically includes supply chain actions to obtain close access to adversary
weapons systems in order to prepare for their degradation and disruption on the battlefield,
during hostilities. It is true that the example provided in the text was done by the CIA, possibly
as a covert action though that is not clear from the sources, but it was also done prior to
enactment of the current statutory definition of covert action. The contention in this Article is
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"traditional military activity" when they occur under the direction and
control of a military commander.
Less clear, though, is whether such actions can be viewed as "routine
support" to military operations when the timeframe is "well in advance"
of any hostilities. Part of the difficulty, as previously discussed, is the
ambiguity of the phrase "well in advance." In addition, using the supply
chain to gain close access to a system will often involve the use of thirdparties that may or may not be foreign nationals of the targeted state. In
fact, of course, the activities described in this section are not "routine"
in any sense of the word. Instead, these activities are directly related to
the conduct of hostilities, either current or anticipated. The fact that
access to targeted systems is required and obtained for purposes of
executing military attacks is a clear indication that these are traditional
military activities, not routine support, and should be regarded as such
regardless of when they occur.
C. Deception Operations:HistoricalOverview
Deception has a long history in warfare. Although probably
apocryphal, the story of the Trojan Horse in ancient Greece is one of the
world's most well-known deception operations: Odysseus and his thirty
Greek warriors hiding inside, waiting for the Trojans to pass out after
their feast, then open the gates for Agamemnon's Greek army to invade

and sack Troy.121
There are many instances of the use of deception to achieve tactical
surprise in specific battles. For instance, George Washington used
disinformation to disengage from British forces around New York City
in order to march to Virginia, join forces with Rochambeau and defeat
Cornwallis at Yorktown.122 In the Second World War, deception
operations were routinely implemented before battles.
Most famous of all was the creation of a ghost army under General
George Patton prior to the invasion of Normandy.123 In the deception
operation, Patton's phony army was deliberately placed in England
across the Channel from Pas de Calais.124 This served to reinforce
German, particularly Hitler's, belief that the invasion of France would
come at Calais.125 Patton's "army" maintained the level of radio traffic
that the military could execute such an operation as a "traditional military activity" during
ongoing or anticipated hostilities.
121. See Robert Graves, The Wooden Horse, in FROM TROY TO ENTEBBE: SPECIAL
OPERATIONS INANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES 4-5 (John Arquilla ed., U. Press of America 1996).

122.

DAVIS, supra note 88, at 260, 262.

123. See NICHOLAS RANKIN, A GENIUS FOR DECEPTION: How CUNNING HELPED THE
BRITISH WIN Two WORLD WARS 398-99 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 2009).

124.
125.

Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
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and communications that would be expected of a force that size. 26In
the other famous World War II tactical deception operation, "Major
William Martin," "The Man Who Never Was," 1 27 washed up on a
Spanish beach with a briefcase of sealed documents that were
surreptitiously examined by the Germans.128 The information learned
caused Hitler to move forces from Sicily to Sardinia and Greece.129 The
Allies successfully landed on Sicily, facing minimal opposition' 3 0 as
Hitler continued to believe that Sicily was a diversion and the main
blow would fall on Greece.131 Although the focus of this section is on
use of deception to accomplish strategic surprise, these Second World
War examples are noteworthy because the results of each were
monitored nearly contemporaneously. This was accomplished thanks to
intelligence from the Ultra program, a British program that intercepted
and decoded German messages due to their analysis of a captured
German Enigma code-machine. 132
Elaborate deception operations often precede the initiation of
hostilities between states. Many times, the deception operation is used
to explain the proximity of the attacker's troops to the target of the
attack. In the Second World War, for instance, Richard Betts's study
found that "[d]eception and disinformation campaigns were integral to
planning and coordinating all Hitler's surprise attacks."' 33 As an
example, prior to Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the
Soviet Union, the Soviets were aware of the massive buildup of German
divisions near Soviet borders.' 34 Germany, however, led the Soviets to
believe that the buildup was for "Operation Sea Lion," the plan for the
126. Id.
127.

EWEN MONTAGU, THE MAN WHO NEVER WAS 110-11, 123 (1953).

128. Id. at 123. This idea was actually a much grander version of the deception plan
carried out by the British before the Third Battle of Gaza in the First World War. See MICHAEL
I. HANDEL, WAR, STRATEGY AND INTELLIGENCE 368 (Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1989). In that
deception operation, a British haversack was "lost" in such a way that it was recovered by the
German-Turkish forces defending Gaza. Id. The haversack's contents indicated that the main
British attack would come at Gaza, which reinforced existing German-Turkish perceptions. Id.
at 370. The attack on Beersheba would be a diversion. The haversack also contained various
accoutrement-what today is called "pocket litter"-such as a personal diary, a small amount of
cash, and "private" letters of soldiers supposedly stationed near Beersheba complaining about
the idea of attacking Gaza. Id. at 368. As with the later invasion of Sicily, even after receiving
reports about the size of the British force attacking Beersheba, the German-Turk High
Command continued to believe that was a feint and that the real attack would come at Gaza. Id.
129.

MONTAGU, supra note 127, at 125-26, 143.

130.
131.

Id. at 126.
Id. at 143.

132.

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE WITH RICHARD H. IMMERMAN, IKE'S SPIES: EISENHOWER AND

THE ESPIONAGE ESTABLISHMENT 62-64, 84 (U. Press of Miss. 1999).

133.
134.

BETrs, supra note 67, at 40.
Id.
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invasion of Great Britain.135 As part of the deception plan, Germany
increased its propaganda toward Great Britain and stopped it against the
Soviet Union, creating a "calm before the storm effect."1 36 At the same
time, Germany executed heavy air raids against Great Britain while
publicly redeploying some divisions westward.1 37 German commanders
in the area of the buildup were also ordered to build field fortifications
that could serve no offensive purpose.' 38 This suggested to the Soviets
that the secondary purpose of the buildup was designed to defend
against a possible Soviet attack.139 The German deception fed into and
reinforced Stalin's self-deception about the German buildup.140
Deception played a significant role in each of the Arab-Israeli
Wars.141 Prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, for instance, the Ewptians
They
and Syrians used "elaborate deception" to achieve surprise.
consciously attempted to maintain a facade of routine activity, including
the use of "exercises" as a cover for troop movements. 143 Taking a page
from the Israeli playbook in 1967,1" the Egyptians demobilized 20,000
troops 48 hours before the attack.145 In addition, the Egyptians and
Syrians had intentionally spread rumors over an extended period of time
regarding alleged shortages of spare parts for their Soviet military
equipment.146 This contributed to American and Israeli intelligence
assessments about the weakness of the Arab forces. 147 Those
assessments, in turn, contributed significantly to the perceptions of

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id
141. In 1956, Israeli actions were intended to give the impression that Jordan, not Egypt,
would be the target of any attack. See HANDEL, supra note 81, at 319. Prior to the Six Days'
War, Moshe Dayan, newly installed as Defense Minister, gave a prominent interview asserting
that (1) it was too late to react unilaterally to the blockade of the straits, (2) Israel had the
capacity to maintain mobilization for a long time, (3) Israel could fight successfully after
absorbing the first blow, and (4) it was too early yet to know whether diplomatic action would
prove futile. BETTS, supra note 67, at 66. Other steps, such as giving thousands of troops leave
and ensuring that photographs of soldiers relaxing on the beach, contributed to this deliberate
"aura of unconcern." Id. Israel attacked thirty-eight hours after Dayan's interview. Id.
142. Michael Handel, Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars, in STRATEGIC
MILITARY SURPRISE, supra note 61, at 111, 136-37.

143.
144.
145.
MILITARY
146.
147.

Id. at 137.
See BETrS, supra note 67, at 66.
Michael Handel, Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars, in STRATEGIC
SURPRISE, supra note 61, at 111, 137.
Id.
Id. at 138.
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Israeli decision-makers that it would be foolhardy for the Arab forces to
attack the militarily stronger Israel.14 8
More recently, deception played a role in the 1991 Gulf War.
Although the initiation of hostilities was probably not a surprise to
Saddam Hussein given the U.N. Resolutions and President George
H.W. Bush's deadline, the location of the coalition's main attack was
considerably uncertain to Hussein and his Generals.14 9 Contributing to
this uncertainty was General Schwarzkopf's use of Marine Amphibious
Forces as a decoy to convince Hussein that at least a significant portion
of the assault would be an amphibious landing from the Arabian
Gulf.1o Preparations even went so far as to include Navy SEAL teams
conducting pre-landing reconnaissance and beach marking activities.'
They also placed explosive charges on the beaches that were later blown
up as the SEALs went back and forth along the Iraqi defenses firing
tracers to simulate the initial phase of an amphibious landing.'5 2 As a
result, Hussein shifted two divisions of troops away from the Saudi
border area, weakening the area of the main coalition assault. i3
D. Deception Operations in Cyberspace
"Cyberattacks are about deception, and the essence of deception is
the difference between what you expect and what you get: surprise. This
is why operational cyberwar is tailor-made for surprise attack."' 54 Here,
deception works on two levels. Information-based actions are deceptive
by nature because of the inherent difficulty in attribution. For purposes
of this Article, that means that information-based actions are usually not
apparent or acknowledged at the time they occur. As we have seen, in
the appropriate context the lack of acknowledgment will usually not
matter for traditional military activities.' 55 The second level of
deception is the use of information-based actions for deception
148. See id. at 139 ("The Israelis therefore incorrectly assumed that the Egyptians and
Syrians would not open a war in which they would lose, particularly because of the 1967
debacle . . ."); see also BETMS, supra note 67, at 69 (stating that observed Arab preparations did
not lead to warning of imminent attack because of "the overpowering political and military
preconceptions of Israeli (and American) officials. Strategic premises smothered tactical
indicators.").
149. See Norman Schwarzkopf - Biography, http://www.achivement.orglautodoc/page/
sch0bio-1 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010); Richard A. Muller, Deceiving Saddam: Was the New
York Times an Unwitting Collaboratorin PentagonMisdirection?,TECH. REv., June 13, 2003.
150. NEILLANDS, supra note i1, at 296-97.
151. Id. at 297.
i52. Id.
153. Id.
154. Lisicl, supranote 13, at 143.
155. See H.R. REP. No. 102-166, at 24 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 243, 252.
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operations in support of conventional, or kinetic, military operations.' 56
Given the statement that information-based actions are "tailor-made"
for supporting surprise attacks through deception, it is somewhat
disconcerting to find very little discussion in the unclassified
information operations literature about surprise attacks, or even
deception. Deception, usually called "military deception," is one of the
pillars or core functions of Information Operations.15 7 Yet, it usually
gets short shrift in Information Operations treatments, despite the fact
that its use to achieve surprise is a well-recognized force multiplier and
the costs of deception operations to the benefits achieved are low.' 5 8
Deception is all about information: controlling what is known about
your actions and operations by either hiding them or feeding false
information to your adversary. The best way to feed a networked
adversary false information, or even true information that may not be
the entire truth, is to have access to the adversary's information system.
Once inside the system, it might then be possible to send bogus e-mail
traffic that "could easily provide misinformation regarding the military
capabilities, intentions, locations, and operations of friendly forces." 1
Such e-mails could allow friendly forces to move into favorable attack
positions i la the British forces at Quebec.' 60 Return e-mails to the
adversary "originator" "could be intercepted and aP ropriately modified
Access inside a
before being displayed to the ['originator']."
command and control network would allow the "spoofing or
impersonation of legitimate authorities" to send false information or
156. Id. at 139. Libicki distinguishes "operational cyberwar" as "the use of a computer
network attack to support physical military operations." Id. at 117. "Operational cyberwar"
should be compared with his concept of "strategic cyberwar," where the primary mode of
warfare is state-to-state "campaign[s] of cyberattacks," with no, or very little, active hostilities
taking place. Id Libicki doubts that strategic cyberwar, by itself, can provide sufficient coercion
at the State level, primarily because sufficient, sustained suffering cannot result from
cyberattacks that are easily mitigated, hard to maintain, much less duplicate. Id. Operational
cyberwar "cannot occupy territory; put people's lives at risk; or, except in specialized cases,
break things." Id. at 140.
157. Dan Kuehl, Introduction: "Brother, Can You Spare Me a DIME?," in INFORMATION
WARFARE: SEPARATING HYPE FROM REALITY 1, 1-5 (Leigh Armistead ed., Potomoc Books, Inc.
2007) (listing military deception as a "core competency" of Information Operations).
158. Barton Whaley, The One Percent Solution: Costs and Benefits of Military Deception,
in INFORMATION STRATEGY AND WARFARE: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 127 (John

Arquilla & Douglas A. Borer eds., Routledge 2007).
159.

TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, supra note 99, at 178. Some of this could also be

accomplished by what Libicki calls "corruption," examples of which are "a sensor that fails to
pick up on certain types of signals, seems less sensitive that [sic] it should be, or misinterprets
what it sees; a communication system that misroutes packets or leaves some nodes mysteriously
in the dark. . . ." LIBICKI, supra note 13, at 147.

160.

See DAVIS, supra note 88, at 244-47.

161.

TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, supra note 99, at 178.
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disrupt the link between the forces in the field and the adversary state's
leadership.162
Of course, access at a sufficiently high level of the network or
system may permit the injection of information directly into the
adversary's decision-making process rather than through indirect
sources, such as the media or through deceptive operational policies
and practices. For the analysis presented in this Article, the purpose of
such an action, as well as the target, will be important for the covert
action-traditional military activity issue. If the purpose is to influence
the political leadership of the adversary state, even if it is to deceive
them as to time and place of an attack, that would easily fit within the
covert action definition. A strong argument could be made under the
legislative history that if hostilities were imminent, such activity could
be a traditional military activity if it were under the direction and
control of a military commander. As a policy matter, such an argument
would be better used on the shelf rather than on the table. Political
influence operations, probably even in a time of hostilities, are best left
to the CIA and the national command authority. After all, given the
scope of some of the deception operations discussed in Part II.C of this
Article (the interview provided by Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan
before the Six Days' War; Hitler's involvement with deception for
Operation Barbarossa), it is apparent that such high-level efforts are
essentially not under the direction and control of a military commander.
Instead, the closer the information-based deception operation gets to the
actual battlefield and targets adversary military commanders in specific
instances, then it is truly the "traditional military activity,"6 4
contemplated by Congress. For example, information-based deception
operations analogous in scope and immediacy to the decoy amphibious
landings in advance of Desert Storm in 1991 would be a traditional
military activity.
Between these two extremes (strategic-political deception and short
duration tactical deception) is the theater-level deception operations
prior to the invasions of Normandy and Sicily. The target of each was
clearly not just the local commander on the ground, but also the political
leadership in the form of Hitler. Although the decoy and deception
162. Id. at 179.
163. MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CONQUEST IN CYBERSPACE: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INFORMATION WARFARE 119 (Cambridge U. Press 2007). Libicki also points to the importance
of knowledge about the adversary leadership in order to effectively tailor information-based
influence messages, much as the deceptions surrounding Operation Husky (Allied invasion of
Sicily) and Operation Barbarossa (German surprise attack on Russia), played into the
preconceptions of Hitler and Stalin, respectively. Id.
164. Or "routine support" for military operations, if the preparations for such tacticallyoriented deception operations occur "well in advance" of hostilities.
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operation in advance of Desert Storm also included Saddam Hussein in
its scope, the preparation and duration of the deceptive activity was
much less and shorter in duration than that for Normandy and Sicily.
The significant commonality between Normandy, Sicily, and Desert
Storm was they were all under the direction and control of a military
commander. Elements on the staff of each military commander were
responsible for the planning and execution of each operation, which
themselves were conducted in large measure by military personnel. This
places such theater-level information-based deception actions and
operations decidedly on the ground of traditional military activities or
"routine support" for military activities when preparations for such
actions and operations occur "well in advance" of hostilities.
III. CONCLUSION

The first step to ensure the military can respond as rapidly as
possible to networked adversaries, whether terrorists or states, is to
make clear that military commanders in the Department of Defense do
not have to make reports to Congress before taking appropriate and
necessary measures in carrying out their duties. Despite any
misconceptions to the contrary in the popular press, Congress made its
intent very clear by making the military commander the fairly bright
line test for what is "traditional military activity." Part I demonstrated
that Congress placed no substantive limit on this definition during
ongoing hostilities or prior to anticipated hostilities. This is the case
whether the activity occurs on the ground, in the air, or in cyberspace
(networks, computers, and information systems).
As the historical parallels to information-based actions and activities
show, there is a wide range of such actions that are traditional military
activities not only because they are under the direction and control of a
military commander, but also because they are conducted for purposes
directly tied to or in support of military operations. Access to networks,
computers, and information systems is endemic to the range of
computer network operations, including exploitation, attack, and
defense. At the strategic level, when an information-based deception
operation passes into the political realm and out of the direction and
control of a military commander, it is no longer a "traditional military
activity," though more tactical, scaled-down efforts at the theater and
battlefield level remain traditional military activities when controlled by
military commanders.
Finally, it is appropriate to return to the beginning and consider anew
the questions raised by the U.S. military shutdown of the extremist
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website. The questions it posedl65 are easily addressed based on even a
cursory review of the legislative history: during ongoing hostilities, the
action by a military commander to eliminate a recruiting and
operational planning tool of the adversary is a traditional military
activity that does not have to be reported to Congress. Given the ease
with which this conclusion is reached, one has to conclude that the
"complex [legal] questions" are merely a red herring thrown out by
those who lost a policy debate. The significant point to draw from the
Article is that there was, in fact, a debate that occurred within a formal
process. Importantly, that process included not just Defense and military
officials, but also CIA officials.
This kind of extensive, interagency policy debate was precisely what
did not occur during the Iran-Contra affair that led Congress to pass the
covert action reporting statute in 1991. Improved processes of review,
in fact, are exactly what Congress did in the Intelligence Authorization
Act for 1991, building on previous attempts to instill process through
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1980. In fact, even in the covert action process today, the Defense
Department does not have a formal role in reviewing proposed covert
actions, which is largely a CIA-National Security Council process, with
the Director of National Intelligence playing a secondary role.
Congress's concern about lack of process for covert action was not
present in the Defense Department. Rigorous and detailed Defense
processes, such as occurred in the case of the extremist website and the
very formal, long-standing Defense Department war planning process,
justified Congress in providing a broad exception for "traditional
military activities."

165. The two questions posed that this Article addresses are: "Is taking out an extremist
Web site a covert operation or a traditional military activity? Should Congress be informed?"
Nakashima, supra note 1, at Al. The third question, "[w]hen is a cyberattack outside the theater
of war allowed," is beyond the scope of this Article, but suffice to say that there is not enough
information in the Nakashima article to determine the basis for the factual assumption
underlying the question (i.e., that it occurred "outside the theater of war"). Id.
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